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A TITLE I DILEMMA: MAY DISABLED FORMER
EMPLOYEES SUE FOR DISCRIMINATION
REGARDING POST-EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS?
Jason D. Myers*
INTRODUCTION
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act1 ("ADA") prohibits
employment discrimination on the basis of disability.' In addition, it
prohibits employers from discriminating against disabled individuals
in the provision of fringe benefits.3 Title I restricts the class of plain-
tiffs to qualified individuals with disabilities.' Further, a Title I plain-
tiff's prima facie case must include evidence that she is capable of
working with or without reasonable accommodations, and that she has
a disability.' A strict reading of this definition suggests a paradox:
Title I claimants must be disabled, yet concurrently must be able to
perform their jobs.
Suppose, for example, that Employee X enrolls in the employee
welfare benefits plan offered by Company Y. Under this plan, dis-
abled employees receive benefits until they reach the age of sixty-five,
if their disability persists. After dedicating twenty-five years of service
to Company Y, Employee X is terminated because of her disability
and is denied payment of benefits under the welfare benefits plan.
Although Employee X could bring a claim under Title I for the dis-
criminatory firing, it is questionable whether she, as a disabled former
employee, could bring a claim under Title I for Company Y's latter
action. At the time of the discriminatory denial of benefits, Employee
X did not hold an "employment position," nor could she perform the
essential functions of her former job. As such, she is not a "qualified
individual with a disability" as defined under Title I. Courts differ,
under these circumstances, about whether disabled former employees
are eligible to sue for discrimination in fringe benefits.
The Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have held that the plain
language of Title I of the ADA protects only currently employable
individuals who are disabled.6 According to these courts, individuals
formerly employed fall outside of this protected class.7 These courts
* To my loving parents, David and Cindy.
1. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
2. See id. § 12112(a).
3. See id § 12112(b)(2).
4. See id § 12111(8).
5. See id
6. See Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 181, 186-87 (6th Cir. 1996);
EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1044 (7th Cir. 1996); Gonzales v. Garner Food
Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 1523, 1526 (11th Cir. 1996).
7. See Parker, 99 F.3d at 187; CNA Ins., 96 F.3d at 1045; Gonzales, 89 F.3d at
1531.
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reason that Congress failed to provide sufficiently broad definitions to
bring disabled former employees within Title I's coverage.8 The Sec-
ond and Third Circuits, however, have held that only a broad reading
of Title I gives full effect to the statute's remedial purpose: 9 to pro-
hibit disability discrimination in all aspects of the employment rela-
tionship, with specific, comprehensive protection from discrimination
in the provision of fringe benefits.1" Rather than resolve legislative
ambiguity in favor of no protection, these courts rely on policy and the
law's remedial purposes to protect disabled former employees. 1
Prior to the Second and Third Circuit decisions, which dealt with
this issue directly, the Supreme Court decided Robinson v. Shell Oil
Co. 2 In Robinson, the Supreme Court recognized that former em-
ployees have a Title VII claim under the Civil Rights Act for post-
employment retaliation by their former employers, consistent with the
broad remedial purpose of the statute.'3 The Court reached this con-
clusion even though former employees are not mentioned in the anti-
retaliation provision of Title VII.' 4 Robinson, however, did not over-
rule the decisions of the Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits because
the Court was considering a Title VII ambiguity that involved the stat-
ute's use of the term "employees.' 15 The present issue, in contrast,
concerns a Title I ambiguity that involves the statute's use of the term
"qualified individual with a disability."' 6
The Second and Third Circuits followed Robinson's reasoning in
deciding this issue.17 Other courts, however, have continued to ad-
here to the pre-Robinson decisions of the Sixth, Seventh, and Elev-
enth Circuits, refusing to revisit these decisions in the absence of a
direct ruling from the Supreme Court. 8 Thus, the issue is ripe for
resolution by the Court.
8. See Parker, 99 F.3d at 187.
9. See Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 608 (3d Cir. 1998); Castellano
v. City of New York, 142 F.3d 58, 69 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Carparts Distribution
Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n, 37 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding that
a former employee with AIDS who was totally disabled and could no longer work had
standing to challenge a disparity in health benefits provided by his former employer).
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b); see also Castellano, 142 F.3d at 68 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(a), (b)(2)).
11. See Ford, 145 F.3d at 606-08; Castellano, 142 F.3d at 67-69.
12. 519 U.S. 337 (1997).
13. See id. at 346. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act establishes a federal right to
equal opportunity in employment. This title expressly prohibits an employer from
discriminating against an employee because of the employee's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
14. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
15. See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 339, 341.
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
17. See Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 606-07 (3d Cir. 1998); Castel-
lano v. City of New York, 142 F.3d 58, 68-69 (2d Cir. 1998).
18. See Fennell v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. Civ. 97-716, 1999 WL 118294, at *3
(D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1999); Erwin v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 999 F. Supp. 1227,
1230 (S.D. Ind. 1998); Fobar v. City of Dearborn Heights, 994 F. Supp. 878, 884 (E.D.
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This Note addresses this conflict, building on previous scholarship
that considered the circuit split in general terms. 9 Part I of this Note
discusses the rules of statutory interpretation. Part II provides a brief
overview of the relevant employment provisions in Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act' and Title V of the Rehabilitation Act,2 ' statutes
similar to the ADA. Part II also offers a general overview of Title I of
the ADA and addresses its purpose, relevant statutory provisions, and
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC") regula-
tory authority. Part III discusses the Eighth Circuit's decision in
Beauford v. Father Flanagan's Boys' Home 2 and the Supreme Court's
decision in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,'3 which interpret provisions in
statutes similar to Title I. Part IV considers and examines the argu-
ments for and against a narrow interpretation of Title I. Part V argues
that the Supreme Court should resolve the ambiguity in Title I, hold-
ing that it covers disabled former employees. In the absence of
Supreme Court resolution of this issue, part V recommends that Con-
gress amend Title I to ensure that disabled former employees receive
Title I protection, particularly in the provision of fringe benefits.
I. THFE RULES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The exercise of statutory interpretation involves the search for the
legislative meaning of a statute in the context of a particular dispute
that is before the court.24 Unquestionably, courts have the power to
Mich. 1998). But see Conners v. Maine Med. Ctr., No. Civ. 98-273, 1999 WL 130307, at
*10 (D. Me. Mar. 3, 1999) (finding disabled former employees may sue under Tftle I
of the ADA for discrimination in disability benefits that they receive post-employ-
ment); Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1158, 1163 (E.D. Va. 1997) (holding
that a disabled former employee is a "qualified individual" for the purpose of bringing
a discrimination suit in disability benefits).
19. See Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., "Substantially Limited" Protection from Disability
Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition
of Disability, 42 Vill. L. Rev. 409, 506-11 (1997) (providing a brief discussion of the
former-employee issue prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Robinson, the Sec-
ond Circuit's decision in Castellano, and the Third Circuit's decision in Ford, which
created the circuit split); Nicole Martinson, Inequality Betveen Disabilities: The Dif-
ferent Treatment of Mental Versus Physical Disabilities in Long-Term Disability Benefit
Plans, 50 Baylor L. Rev. 361,363- 69 (1998) (providing a brief overview of the current
circuit split, as part of a larger article addressing the differing treatment between
physical and mental disabilities in long-term disability benefit plans); see also Recent
Case, Statutory Interpretation-Americans with Disabilities Act-Third Circuit Holds
That Unemployable Former Employees May Sue Employers, 112 Harv. L Rev. 1118,
1118-23 (1999) (discussing the Third Circuit's decision in Ford and criticizing the
court's rationale as quasi-legislative decision-making).
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17(1994).
21. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-794 (1994).
22. 831 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1987).
23. 519 U.S. 337 (1997).
24. See Abner J. Mikva & Eric Lane, An Introduction to Statutory Interpretation
and the Legislative Process 6 (1997).
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interpret the law.25 With respect to statutes, however, courts may not
infer any meaning they choose to satisfy their policy objectives.2 6
Rather, the separation-of-powers doctrine dictates that the judiciary
must defer to the command of Congress.2 7 As such, courts must con-
duct this statutory exercise within a traditional framework of interpre-
tive rules that seek to comply with these principles.
The traditional theory of statutory interpretation instructs courts to
begin with the language of a statute.2 8 There are circumstances, how-
ever, when courts are unable to apply the plain meaning of the statute
because it provides an absurd result or it contravenes the intent of
Congress. 9 In these cases, courts turn to other interpretive tools,
which include the legislative history and purpose of the statute.30 Ac-
cordingly, this part addresses the framework of statutory
interpretation.
A. The Plain Meaning of the Statute
A court's first task in interpreting a statute is to determine whether
the meaning of the statute is clear or ambiguous.3' In making such a
determination, a court must begin with the statutory language in ques-
tion.32 The plain meaning rule dictates that if the plain language is
unambiguous, then the judicial inquiry must cease.33 In such cases,
the congressional intent is plain from the language of the statute and,
therefore, a court usually must refrain from using other tools of
construction.34
It is permissible, however, for a court to look beyond the literal
language of a statute when its meaning is ambiguous. 35 Further, even
25. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 173-79 (1803).
26. See Mikva & Lane, supra note 24, at 4.
27. See id.; Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 265 (1990); Cass R.
Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution 113 (1990).
28. See Mikva & Lane, supra note 24, at 9; 2A George Sutherland, Statutes and
Statutory Construction § 45.01, at 1 (5th ed. 1992).
29. See 2A Sutherland, supra note 28, § 46.07, at 126; see also Church of the Holy
Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 460 (1892) ("If a literal construction of the
words of a statute be absurd, the act must be so construed as to avoid the absurdity.").
30. See Church of the Holy Trinty, 143 U.S. at 462-65.
31. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997).
32. See Mikva & Lane, supra note 24, at 9.
33. See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 340 (observing that the "inquiry must cease if the
statutory language is unambiguous and the 'statutory scheme is coherent and consis-
tent' (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989)));
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (stating that the inquiry should
end "if that is plain, and if the law is within the constitutional authority of the law-
making body which passed it, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according
to its terms"); 2A Sutherland, supra note 28, § 46.01, at 81.
34. See Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 485 (observing that if the statutory language "is
plain and admits of no more than one meaning the duty of interpretation does not
arise and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion").
35. See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 345.
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if the statutory language is unambiguous, there are rare circumstances
when a court may go beyond the plain language of the statute.36
These circumstances include instances when a literal application of the
statutory language would lead to an absurd result or would produce a
result that obviously runs counter to the intent of Congress. 7 In such
cases, the statute "must be so construed to avoid the absurdity."'3
The remainder of this part discusses other sources courts use to dis-
cern a statute's effect.
B. Legislative History
A court may use the legislative history of a statute to construe its
meaning when the court is unable to determine this meaning from the
statute's plain language. 39 For this purpose, the court's use of the leg-
islative history of a statute is reasonable because it frequently pro-
vides relevant information that enables a court to understand the
circumstances that surrounded the statute's enactment.40 Such knowl-
edge may permit a court to determine the legislative intent regarding
the statutory language in question more precisely" and, in doing so,
honor the will of Congress.4 2
The legislative history of a statute can be derived from many
sources.43 Most commonly, a court may rely on congressional floor
debates or committee reports' to determine Congress's intent.45 A
court, however, may not construe the meaning of a statute on the ba-
36. See Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454-55
(1989); see also United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44
(1940) ("When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is
available, there certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear
the words may appear on 'superficial examination."' (citations omitted)).
37. See Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 454; see also Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. at 242
(stating that "[t]he plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the
'rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demon-
strably at odds with the intentions of its drafters."' (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Con-
tractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982))).
38. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 460 (1892).
39. See Mikva & Lane, supra note 24, at 29.
40. See it; 2A Sutherland, supra note 28, § 48.02, at 308.
41. See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes,
65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 845, 848 (1992).
42. See id. at 845.
43. See 2A Sutherland, supra note 28, §§ 48.01-48.19, at 301-74 (providing an ex-
tensive discussion of the different pieces of legislative history).
44. Reports of conference committees are viewed as the most important pieces of
legislative history in determining congressional intent. See id. § 48.08, at 340; see also
Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing
Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 Am. U. L Rev.
277, 306 (1990) (arguing that the use of the legislative history of a statute is legitimate
because it represents the "authoritative product of the institutional work of the
Congress").
45. See 2A Sutherland, supra note 28, §§ 48.08-48.11, at 339-49.
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sis of congressional statements made in favor of a rejected or failed
bill.
4 6
Some have criticized courts' use of legislative history to construe
the meaning of a statute.47 Much of the criticism questions the relia-
bility of a statute's legislative history and courts' overuse of such evi-
dence. 48 Nevertheless, such criticism generally provides no alternative
statutory guides for courts to use when the language of a statute is
silent or ambiguous on a particular question of legal significance. 49 As
a general rule, courts must act prudently when they explore the legis-
lative history of a statute.50
Though a statute's legislative history is not the place to begin, it
does serve as a useful statutory guide when a court must determine
the meaning of ambiguous statutory language. There are circum-
stances, however, when the legislative history itself is also ambiguous
or inconclusive. In these cases, a court may look to additional statu-
tory tools, such as the purposes of the statute, to construe legislative
meaning.
C. Statutory Purpose
When both the plain meaning of a statute and its legislative history
prove unfruitful in determining how the statute should be applied,
courts have used a statute's purpose to guide their interpretations. 5'
Indeed, the Supreme Court has instructed lower courts to avoid a
strict interpretation of a statute if the result would contradict the rem-
edies that Congress intended to provide.5"
46. See id. § 48.01, at 302.
47. See Mikva & Lane, supra note 24, at 29-31; see also Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507
U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (paraphrasing Judge Harold Leventhal
that "[courts'] use of legislative history [is] the equivalent of entering a crowded cock-
tail party and looking over the heads of the guests for one's friends").
48. See Mikva & Lane, supra note 24, at 39-42; see also Breyer, supra note 41, at
861-69 (discussing the arguments against the use of legislative history in statutory
interpretation).
49. See Breyer, supra note 41, at 869.
50. See Mikva & Lane, supra note 24, at 40-41; see also Felix Frankfurter, Some
Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 543 (1947) ("Spurious
use of legislative history must not swallow the legislation so as to give point to the
quip that only when legislative history is doubtful do you go to the statute.").
51. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 345 (1997); see also 2A Suther-
land, supra note 28, § 46.01, at 82 (holding that a court must enforce the statute's plain
meaning unless "the natural and customary import of the statute's language is either
repugnant to the general purview of the act or for some other compelling reason").
52. See NLRB v. Plasterers' Local Union No. 79, 404 U.S. 116, 130 (1971) (observ-
ing the Court's refusal to "construe legislation aimed to protect a certain class in a
fashion that will run counter to the goals Congress clearly intended to effectuate");
see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(criticizing courts for being "apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law
where those words import a policy that goes beyond them"); Church of the Holy
Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 463 (1892) (noting that a statutory guide to the
meaning of a statute is found "in the evil which it is designed to remedy").
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A court may discover the statute's purpose by examining the spe-
cific reasons underlying Congress's enactment of the statute.53 In ad-
dition, Congress may have included the purpose within a particular
statutory provision.54 Indeed, some reason that courts' use of the stat-
ute's purpose is vital to "preserve the concept of legislative supremacy
and separation of powers."'55
In short, the rules of statutory interpretation provide courts with a
framework to guide them when they must exercise their judicial func-
tion to determine the legislative meaning of a statute. Before examin-
ing how courts apply these rules with respect to Title I of the ADA,
however, part II provides a brief overview of the statute itself, as well
as two similar predecessor statutes.
II. OVERVIEW OF TITLE I OF THE ADA
The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") was signed into law
on July 26, 1990.56 Through the ADA's enactment, Congress broke
down barriers that had prevented individuals with disabilities from en-
joying the same employment opportunities and public accommoda-
tions that are available to persons without disabilitiesY Thus, the
ADA is arguably the most significant civil rights legislation since the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.8
Notably, the ADA marks the first civil rights statute that has broad
application for disabled individuals.59 The law prohibits disability dis-
crimination in employment,' public accommodations and services of-
fered by private entities,6' public services offered by governmental
entities,62 and telecommunications services. 63 Toward this end, Con-
gress established both a national policy to eliminate discrimination
against individuals with disabilities and a federal law to provide clear
and concise standards to enforce this policy.64
53. See Mikva & Lane, supra note 24, at 8.
54. See id
55. Id at 11.
56. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994)).
57. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 1, at 24 (1990) (stating that the ADA would
bring disabled individuals into the mainstream of American society), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 268.
58. See John W. Parry, Employment Under the ADA: A National Perspective, 15
Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 525, 525 (1991); Steven A. Holmes, Sweeping
U.S. Law to Help Disabled Goes into Effect: Gains Seen for Millions, N.Y. Times, Jan.
27, 1992, at Al.
59. See Nancy Lee Jones, Overview and Essential Requirements of tile Americans
with Disabilities Act, 64 Temp. L. Rev. 471, 471 (1991).
60. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117.
61. See id §§ 12181-12189.
62. See id §§ 12131-12165.
63. See 47 U.S.C. § 225 (1994).
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)-(2) ("It is the purpose of this chapter-(I) to pro-
vide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimina-
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Prior to the ADA, Congress had passed two other civil rights stat-
utes that offered similar employment protections. This part first pro-
vides a brief overview of these statutes: Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act and Title V of the Rehabilitation Act. This part then considers
the employment discrimination provisions of Title I, along with the
EEOC's enforcement authority of these provisions.
A. Employment Protections Under Other Civil Rights Statutes
Employment discrimination against certain classes of individuals
has plagued American society for many years. Such discrimination
denies a person the opportunity to achieve independence and to be-
come a productive member of society.66 Accordingly, Congress re-
sponded to this injustice by enacting several civil rights statutes that
primarily sought to combat employment discrimination against indi-
viduals who have been historically the subjects of such action. Most
prominently, these statutes include Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
196467 and Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.68
1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 69 during a period
of civil unrest in the United States.7" Congress, by its enactment,
sought to provide minorities with equal opportunities in all aspects of
American life, particularly in the workplace.7' In doing so, Congress
sent a message that the United States would no longer tolerate em-
ployment discrimination.72
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act covers discrimination in the work-
place.73 This title may be the most significant portion of the Civil
Rights Act because employment provides "the key to indepen-
dence."74 Title VII establishes a federal right to equal opportunity in
tion against individuals with disabilities; [and) (2) to provide clear, strong, consistent,
enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with
disabilities.").
65. See Harish C. Jain & Peter J. Sloane, Equal Employment Issues: Race and Sex
Discrimination in the United States, Canada, and Britain 1 (1981).
66. See Elizabeth Clark Morin, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: Integra-
tion Through Employment, 40 Cath. U. L. Rev. 189, 195 (1990).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17.
68. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-794 (1994).
69. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17).
70. See Charles Whalen & Barbara Whalen, The Longest Debate: A Legislative
History of the 1964 Civil Rights Act at xv-xx (1985).
71. See S. Rep. No. 88-872, at 8 (1964) ("The time has come to assure equal access
for all Americans to all areas of community life."), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2355, 2362-63.
72. See Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970).
73. See H.R. Rep. No. 88-914, at 26 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391,
2401.
74. Parry, supra note 58, at 525.
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employment 75 and expressly prohibits an employer from discriminat-
ing against an employee because of the employee's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin. 6 Title VII also protects employees who
utilize the remedial mechanisms of the statute from retaliation by
their employers.' This protection unquestionably extends to both
current and former employees.7'
Over the years, some members of Congress attempted to amend the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include individuals with disabilities. 9
These attempts failed, however, because traditional civil rights groups
feared that any substantive amendments to this Act would compro-
mise the original statutory protections.'0 Thus, individuals with disa-
bilities were left without protection against discrimination in the
workplace until Congress finally enacted Title V of the Rehabilitation
Act in 1973.
2. Title V of the Rehabilitation Act
Title V of the Rehabilitation Act8 l marked the first significant piece
of legislation to provide equal protection to individuals with disabili-
ties.' Through its enactment, Congress sought to empower disabled
75. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
76. Section 703(a) states in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individ-
ual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
77. Section 704(a) states in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees or applicants for employment ... because he
has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or partici-
pated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
subchapter.
Id. § 2000e-3(a).
78. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (holding that former
employees have a Title VII claim for post-employment retaliation by their former
employers).
79. See Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and
Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 Harv. C.R.-C.L L Rev.
413, 429 (1991) [hereinafter Burgdorf, Analysis and Implications].
80. See id.
81. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as 29
U.S.C. §§ 791-794 (1994)).
82. See Bonnie P. Tucker, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act After Ten Years of
Enforcement The Past and the Future, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 845, 847-48.
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individuals to obtain employment independence, economic self-suffi-
ciency, and inclusion and integration into American society.83 Title V
provides disabled individuals with an array of protections against em-
ployment discrimination.' Sections 501 and 503 require federal agen-
cies and most federal contractors to take affirmative measures to
employ and advance in employment individuals with disabilities.,5
Further, section 504 operates as the general provision that provides
explicit protection to disabled individuals. This section prohibits fed-
eral employers and private employers who receive federal assistance
from discriminating against disabled individuals.8 6
The plain language of section 504 only covers "otherwise qualified
individual[s] with a disability."87 Although the Rehabilitation Act
does not define this term,8 8 the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare ("DOH")8 9 issued regulations that provide some interpretive
guidance. 90 With respect to employment, these regulations define
"otherwise qualified handicapped person[s]" as persons who can per-
form the essential functions of the job in question with a reasonable
accommodation. 91
Title V, unlike Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, creates a protected
class of individuals that must prove that they are "otherwise qualified
83. See 29 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1).
84. See id. §§ 791-794.
85. See id. §§ 791, 793.
86. Section 504 states in relevant part:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability... shall, solely by reason
of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity con-
ducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.
Id. § 794(a).
87. See id.
88. The Rehabilitation Act defines an individual with a disability as "any person
who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of
such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is
regarded as having such an impairment." 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(b). The Act, however,
did not define the "otherwise qualified" requirment. See Gonzales v. Garner Food
Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 1523, 1529 (11th Cir. 1996) (observing that the phrase "otherwise
qualified handicapped individual" is not defined in the Rehabilitation Act).
89. Now known as Health and Human Services ("HHS"), this agency has the au-
thority to promulgate regulations under the Rehabilitation Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 794.
The responsibility for implementing regulations under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
was transferred from HEW/HHS to the Department of Justice (DOJ) in 1980, and the
regulations promulgated by HEW/HHS were adopted by the DOJ. See 45 Fed. Reg.
72,995, 72,997 (1980); Laura F. Rothstein, Disabilities and the Law § 1.02, at 5 (1992).
90. See 28 C.F.R.. §§ 41.31-41.32 (1998).
91. See id. § 41.32 (defining the term "qualified handicapped person" as meaning
"a handicapped person who, with reasonable accommodation, can perform the essen-
tial functions of the job in question"). These regulations define this term with respect
to service as "a handicapped person who meets the essential eligibility requirements
for receipt of such services." See id.
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individuals with handicaps." 92 Inclusion of this requirement limits the
extent of the statute's coverage to individuals who can meet the appli-
cable employment standards.93 Further, Title V's coverage provides
no protection to disabled individuals who work for employers that re-
ceive no federal funding.94 Many criticized this limited coverage of-
fered by Title V.95 Accordingly, Congress enacted Title I of the ADA
to expand protections for disabled employees in the private sector.96
B. Title I of the ADA
Title I of the ADA ostensibly ensures equal access to employment
opportunities for qualified individuals with disabilities.97 Moreover,
Congress sought to eliminate disability discrimination in all aspects of
the employment relationship, including the administration of fringe
benefits.98 Title I specifies that an employer must not discriminate
"against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disabil-
ity of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hir-
ing, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges
of employment." 99 The statute provides that "discriminate" includes
"participating in a contractual or other arrangement or relationship
that has the effect of subjecting a covered entity's qualified applicant
or employee with a disability to the discrimination prohibited by this
subchapter."1°  This provision protects individuals with disabilities
from discrimination in the area of fringe benefits,' which include
pensions, health and life insurance benefits, and other post-employ-
ment benefits.10 2
Title I protection extends to individuals with many different types of
disabilities. The ADA defines a disability as "a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life ac-
tivities of such individual [or] a record of such an impairment or being
regarded as having such an impairment."' 03 Although the ADA de-
92. See Burgdorf, Analysis and Implications, supra note 79, at 442 (stating that
Title VII focuses on "the discriminatory acts that occur, not the qualities of the person
discriminated against").
93. See 28 C.F.R. § 41.32.
94. See Jones, supra note 59, at 475-78.
95. See, e.g., Robert E. Rains, A Pre-History of the Americans with Disabilites Act
and Some Initial Thoughts as to Its Constitutional Implications, 11 St. Louis U. Pub. L.
Rev. 185, 188-91 (1992) (explaining the deficiencies of the Rehabilitation Act in the
protection of individuals with disabilities); Tucker, supra note 82, at 848-50 (same).
96. See Jones, supra note 59, at 481-84.
97. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1994).
98. See Castellano v. City of New York, 142 F3d 58, 68 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b)(2)).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
100. Id. § 12112(b)(2).
101. See id
102. See Castellano, 142 F.3d at 68.
103. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
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fines the term "disability" broadly, Title I restricts the type of plaintiff
who may sue under its provisions to a "qualified individual with a
disability."° 4
Title I defines a "qualified individual with a disability" as an "indi-
vidual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommoda-
tion, can perform the essential functions of the employment position
that such individual holds or desires."' 0 5 Congress inserted the phrase
"essential functions' 0 6 to ensure that employers could continue to re-
quire, without repercussion, that all workers be able to perform the
non-marginal functions of their employment positions."° In addition,
Congress indicated that employers must not consider an individual's
potential for future incapacity when deciding whether an individual is
qualified for employment. 10 8 Rather, employers must make this de-
termination at the time of the employment action in question.1"9
Thus, Congress, by including the term "qualified individual with a dis-
ability" in Title I, sought to preserve an employer's ability to select
and maintain the most qualified workers."0
Title I's broad statutory language demonstrates Congress's intent to
extend protection to all individuals with disabilities."' It is reason-
able, however, that courts could find such language ambiguous and
subsequently apply the statute in a way that is inconsistent with the
intent of Congress." 2 Therefore, Congress gave the EEOC the au-
thority to promulgate regulations to implement the provisions of Title
1. 1 13
104. See id. § 12111(8).
105. Id. An employer, however, need not provide a reasonable accommodation if
such accommodation would pose an undue hardship on the operation of its business.
See id. § 12111(9)-(10).
106. The House Report describes the phrase "essential functions" as "job tasks that
are fundamental and not marginal." H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 55 (1990), re-
printed in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 337.
107. See id., reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 337.
108. See id. (explaining that the determination of whether a person is qualified
should be made at the time of the employment action, for example, hiring or promo-
tion, and should not be based on the possibility that the employee or applicant will
become incapacitated and unqualified in the future), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 337.
109. See id., reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 337.
110. See id. at 55-56 (using the term "qualified individual with a disability" to "reaf-
firm that [the ADA] does not undermine an employer's ability to choose and main-
tain qualified workers," and to allow employers to select the most qualified applicant
available rather than be obliged to "prefer applicants with disabilities over other ap-
plicants on the basis of disability"), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 337-338.
111. See Jones, supra note 59, at 479 n.58.
112. See Thomas H. Barnard, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Nightmare for
Employers and Dream for Lawyers?, 64 St. John's L. Rev. 229, 239-42 (1990).
113. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994).
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C. The EEOC's Regulatory Authority Under Title I
Congress created the EEOC in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.114 The EEOC serves as an extension of the federal government
and focuses on the eradication of employment discrimination."lS The
EEOC is responsible for enforcing both Title I of the ADA and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act. 1 6 Additionally, the ADA incorporates,
by reference, the administrative and remedial scheme of Title VII n7
At Congress's command,"' the EEOC issued regulations regarding
the ADA in 1991, one year prior to the ADA's effective date, to pro-
vide employers and employees adequate time to understand the
law. 1 9 Turning to the relevant Title I regulations, the EEOC defined
an employee as "an individual employed by an employer."'"0 In addi-
tion, the EEOC defined a "qualified individual with a disability" as
"an individual with a disability who satisfies the requisite skill, experi-
ence, education and other job-related requirements of the employ-
ment position such individual holds or desires, and who, with or
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential func-
tions of such position."'' Within this definition, the phrase "essential
functions" means the "fundamental job duties of the employment po-
sition the individual with a disability holds or desires."'" Further-
more, the EEOC regulations state that an employer may not
discriminate against individuals with disabilities regarding "[firinge
benefits available by virtue of employment, whether or not adminis-
tered by the covered entity."'1 3
The EEOC regulations do not specifically exclude disabled former
employees from the coverage of Title I. In fact, one regulation sug-
gests that Title I affords more inclusive protection to disabled former
employees. This regulation states that an employer may not discrimi-
114. See id § 2000e-4. See generally Rebecca Hanner White, The EEOC, the
Courts, and Employment Discrimination Policy: Recognizing tie Agency's Leading
Role in Statutory Interpretation, 1995 Utah L. Rev. 51 (discussing the EEOC's admin-
istrative and enforcement responsibilities under several federal statutes).
115. See White, supra note 114, at 53.
116. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116.
117. See id § 12117. An aggrieved individual must exhaust the administrative pro-
cess by timely filing a claim with the EEOC. See id. § 2000e-5(b), (e), (f). The EEOC
may investigate, attempt to conciliate the charges, and prosecute violators. See id.
After receiving a "right to sue" letter from the EEOC, the individual may file a pri-
vate suit in state or federal court. See id. § 2000e-5(f).
118. See id § 12116; see also H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 82 (1990) (stating that
the these regulations will have "the force and effect of law"), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 364-65.
119. See 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726 (July 26, 1991) (codified at 29 C.F.R.
§§ 1630.1-1630.16 (1998)).
120. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(f). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act defines the term
"employee" in the same manner. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).
121. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m).
122. See i. § 1630.2(n).
123. See id § 1630A(f).
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nate against individuals with disabilities regarding the "[h]iring, up-
grading, promotion, award of tenure, demotion, transfer, layoff,
termination, right of return from layoff, and rehiring. ' 124 With respect
to "rehiring," this term necessarily refers to former employees be-
cause an employer does not ordinarily hire individuals who are al-
ready employees.
The EEOC also issued interpretive guidelines to courts, explaining
how to resolve certain ADA issues. l" Specifically, the EEOC sug-
gested how courts should determine whether a disabled individual is a
"qualified individual with a disability" for purposes of Title I protec-
tion,'26 with the determination being made at the time of the employ-
ment decision.127
The Supreme Court's decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.1"8 provided courts with a two-step
analysis that they should follow when considering an agency's inter-
pretation of a statute. 29 A court's first step is to decide whether Con-
gress has spoken to the specific statutory question at issue in the plain
text of the statute. 30 If the statutory language is silent or ambiguous
with respect to this issue, and Congress explicitly delegated an agency
with the authority to interpret a statute by regulation,'3 then the
court must accept the agency interpretation unless it is "arbitrary, ca-
pricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.' 32
With these principles in mind, the EEOC regulations to Title I of
the ADA bind courts because Congress ordered the EEOC to issue
them. 33 The interpretive guidelines to Title I, however, do not bind
124. See id. § 1630.4(b).
125. See id. § 1630 interpretive guideline (1998) (stating that the purpose of these
guidelines is to "ensure that qualified individuals with disabilities understand their
rights under this part and to facilitate and encourage compliance by covered
entities").
126. See id. § 1630.2(m) interpretive guideline (instructing that it must first be de-
termined whether the individual satisfies the prerequisites for the employment posi-
tion, and next whether the individual can perform the essential functions of the
position held or desired, with or without reasonable accommodation).
127. See id. (declaring that the "determination should be based on the capabilities
of the individual with a disability at the time of the employment decision, and should
not be based on speculation that the employee may become unable in the future or
may cause increased health insurance premiums or workers compensation").
128. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
129. See id. at 842-44; see also Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations
Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 16-17 (1990) (discussing the
various forms of agency interpretation and examining the circumstances when courts
are bound to accept an agency's interpretation of a statute).
130. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
131. See id. at 843-44.
132. See id. at 844 ("[A] court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administration of an agency.").
133. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994).
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courts.' Although these guidelines do not have the force of law,
courts nonetheless defer to them because of the EEOC's expertise in
administering Title I of the ADA.'3 5I Congress's enactment of the ADA demonstrates a national commit-
ment to eradicating discrimination against protected classes of individ-
uals in all aspects of the employment relationship. 13-6 Courts,
however, have struggled to carry out this intention. Proponents of
both narrow and broad interpretations of Title I of the ADA have
relied on court decisions that interpret similar provisions under Title
V of the Rehabilitation Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 37
Part III discusses these decisions.
Ill. DECISIONS INTERPRETING SIMILAR PROVISIONS UNDER THE
REHABILITATION AcT AND TITLE VII
Whether disabled former employees fall within Title I's coverage
depends upon how a court interprets the statutory language. Whereas
a narrow construction of Title I deprives disabled former employees
of a Title I claim, a broad construction of Title I permits disabled for-
mer employees to bring such a claim. Both of these interpretive ap-
proaches find support in court decisions that interpret similar
provisions under Title V of the Rehabilitation Act and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act. The Eighth Circuit's decision in Beau ford v. Father
Flanagan's Boys' Home 3 ' supports a narrow interpretation of Title I
of the ADA. On the other hand, the Supreme Court's decision in
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.1 39 supports a broad interpretation. Accord-
ingly, this part examines the court decisions and the rationales they
offer.
A. Beauford v. Father Flanagan's Boys' Home
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, like Title I of the ADA, pro-
hibits discrimination on the basis of disability in regard to fringe bene-
134. See Anthony, supra note 129, at 55-58 (stating that agency guidelines do not
have the force of law and, therefore, are not controlling on courts even if they repre-
sent a reasonable interpretation of the statute).
135. See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (observing
that an agency's guidelines, "while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their
authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which Skid-
more v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944))); Washington v. HCA Health Servs. of
Texas, Inc., 152 F.3d 464,470 (5th Cir. 1998) (giving "more than minimal deference to
the EEOC's Interpretive Guidelines" when analyzing a statutory issue under Title I of
the ADA); see also Anthony, supra note 129, at 55-59 (explaining that agency guide-
lines do not have the force of law, but courts often defer to these guidelines in light of
the agency's expertise and status as the delegate of Congress).
136. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)-(2).
137. See infra Part III.
138. 831 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1987).
139. 519 U.S. 337 (1997).
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fits. 4 ° The plain language of section 504 extends coverage only to
"otherwise qualified individual[s] with a disability."14 ' Section 504,
unlike Title I of the ADA, does not define this term. 4 The DOJ
regulations, however, provide courts with some interpretive gui-
dance. 143 Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in Southeastern Commu-
nity College v. Davis,'44 interpreted "otherwise qualified handicapped
individuals" under section 504 as persons who, despite their disability,
are able to satisfy the requirements of a particular program. 145
The Eighth Circuit's decision in Beauford v. Father Flanagan's Boys'
Home146 supports a narrow interpretation of Title I of the ADA. 147 In
Beauford, the plaintiff was unable to continue working as a school
teacher because of mental and physical problems. 48 After the de-
fendant denied the plaintiff disability and health benefits, the plaintiff
brought suit under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.1 49 She
claimed that her benefits had been denied because of her handicap.1 50
The district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the
complaint.' 5' The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that employees
who are no longer able to do their jobs are not "otherwise qualified
handicapped individuals" covered by the Rehabilitation Act.1 52 In
reaching its decision, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that the plain lan-
guage of section 504 reflects the will of the legislature to protect only
those disabled individuals who are able to perform the duties of their
employment positions.'53 According to the court, the statutory lan-
guage of section 504 does not contemplate protection for those dis-
140. See Beauford v. Father Flanagan's Boys' Home, 831 F.2d 768, 770 (8th Cir.
1987) (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.11(b)(6) (1986)).
141. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
142. See Gonzales v. Garner Food Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 1523, 1529 (11th Cir. 1996).
143. See 28 C.F.R. § 41.32 (1998) (defining "qualified handicapped person[s]").
144. 442 U.S. 397 (1979). In this case, a clinical registered nurse training program
excluded a woman with a serious hearing disability. See id. at 402. The Court deter-
mined that there were no modifications that the college could make that would enable
the plaintiff to successfully participate in the program. See id. at 407-13. Thus, the
Court held that § 504 did not cover the plaintiff because she was not an otherwise
qualified handicapped individual. See id. at 413-14.
145. See id. at 406 (holding that an otherwise qualified handicapped individual "is
one who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his handicap").
146. 831 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1987).
147. Indeed, the Sixth and the Seventh Circuits incorporated the Beauford ration-
ale into their holdings that deprived disabled former employees of a Title I claim in
the provision of fringe benefits. See Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 181,
186 (6th Cir. 1996); EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1045 (7th Cir. 1996).
148. See Beauford, 831 F.2d at 770.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id. at 771.
152. See id. ("[B]oth the language of the statute and its interpretation by the
Supreme Court [in Davis] indicate that section 504 was designed to prohibit discrimi-
nation within the ambit of an employment relationship in which the employee is po-
tentially able to do the job in question.").
153. See id.
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abled individuals who are unable to do their jobs.15 The Eighth
Circuit recognized that such discrimination is "an undesirable
thing,"'55 but nonetheless refused to employ other interpretive guides
to avoid the apparent absurdity.1 5 6
B. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits an employer from dis-
criminating against an employee on the basis of "race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin."' 57 In addition, section 704(a) of Title VII pro-
hibits employers from retaliating against employees and applicants for
employment. 58 This section, however, does not specifically refer to
former employees. Thus, circuit courts were divided on the issue of
whether former employees could sue for retaliatory acts after the em-
ployment relationship has ended. While the majority of circuits had
held that former employees are included within the coverage of sec-
tion 704(a),159 which preserves Title VII's remedial purpose of elimi-
nating employment discrimination,16 a few circuits had found that
former employees fell beyond the scope of this section. 161 To resolve
this conflict, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Robinson v.
Shell Oil Co.162
In Robinson, Shell Oil Company ("Shell") had terminated Charles
T. Robinson from its employ in 1991.163 Shortly thereafter, Robinson
filed a complaint with the EEOC, claiming that he was fired because
of his race."6 While that complaint was pending, Robinson applied
for a job with another company that contacted Shell for an employ-
ment reference. 65 According to Robinson, Shell gave him a negative
154. See id.
155. Id at 773.
156. See id.
157. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
158. See id § 2000e-3(a).
159. See Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F-3d 194, 200 (3d Cir. 1994); Bailey
v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506, 1509-1510 (11th Cir. 1988); O'Brien v. Sky Chefs, Inc.,
670 F.2d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 1982); Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co., 581 F.2d 1052, 1054-
55 (2d Cir. 1978); Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162, 1165
(10th Cir. 1977); see also Patricia A. Moore, Parting Is Such Sweet Sorrow: The Appli-
cation of 7itle VII to Post-Employinent Retaliation, 62 Fordham L Rev. 205, 206
(1993) (arguing that section 704(a) of Title VII should protect former employees
against acts of employer retaliation, but restricting liability to only those post-employ-
ment actions that relate to an employment relationship).
160. See Moore, supra note 159, at 206.
161. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 70 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that
Title VII's anti-retaliation provision does not apply to former employees), rev'd, 519
U.S. 337 (1997); Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 492 (7th Cir. 1991) (declining to
extend protection to former employees under section 704(a) of Title VII).
162. 517 U.S. 1154 (1996).
163. See 519 U.S. at 339.
164. See id.
165. See id
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reference. 166 Robinson claimed that this reference was given in retali-
ation for his EEOC complaint.1 67 Robinson subsequently filed suit
under the anti-retaliation provision, section 704(a), of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.168 Shell moved to dismiss the complaint,
arguing that section 704(a) did not provide former employees a cause
of action against their former employers for post-employment retalia-
tion.169 The district court dismissed the complaint, adhering to Fourth
Circuit precedent that held that section 704(a) does not apply to for-
mer employees.1 70 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed. 171
The Supreme Court followed the rules of statutory interpretation,
looking first to section 704(a) to determine whether its meaning was
plain or ambiguous.17 ' In making this determination, the Court con-
sidered several factors, including "reference to the language itself, the
specific context in which the language is used, and the broader context
of the statute as a whole."' 73 With respect to the language of section
704(a), the Court provided several reasons as to why the term "em-
ployee" was ambiguous. According to the Court, the ambiguity
stemmed from section 704(a)'s lack of a temporal qualifier of the term
"employee." '74 For example, the Court pointed out that the phrases
"current employees" and "former employees" are not in the language
of Title VII.175 Moreover, Title VII defines the term "employee" as
"an individual employed by an employer."'17 6 The Court found this
definition lacked a plain meaning: it could be read to mean was em-
ployed just as easily as is employed. 177
The Court also examined other provisions within Title VII that used
the term "employee" to refer to someone other than a current em-
ployee. For example, the Court noted that sections 706(g)(1) and
717(b) authorize affirmative remedial action that "may include ...
reinstatement or hiring of employees.' 1 78 Because one does not rein-
state current employees, the Court reasoned that this language argua-
bly refers to former employees. 79 At the same time, however, the
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id. at 340.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. Id. at 341.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1994).
177. See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 342. The Court also rejected a similar argument
asserted by Shell. Shell argued that the addition of the term "his" before "employ-
ees" narrows the scope of section 704(a). See id. at 344. The Court disagreed, noting
that the use of the term "employee" alone does not demonstrate whether an individ-
ual ever had been, or currently was, an employee. See id.
178. See id. at 342 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(g)(1), 2000e-16(b)).
179. See id.
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Court found that there are occasions when Title VII unambiguously
describes an employee as one who is currently in an employment posi-
tion."- The Court concluded, therefore, that these examples illustrate
that the meaning of "employee" may change in context. 8
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court determined that the
term "employees" in section 704(a) of Title VII was ambiguous.1 2 As
such, it proceeded to an analysis of the broader context and primary
purpose of the statute to resolve the ambiguity.'1 3 The Court relied
upon those sections in Title VII that plainly demonstrate "former em-
ployees" may take advantage of the law's remedial mechanisms.', In
addition, Title VII protects employees from retaliation,as5 and a
charge of unlawful discharge would necessarily have to be brought by
former employees. Thus, the Court reasoned, it was more consistent
to include former employees within section 704(a)'s coverage.'8
Noting that section 704(a)'s primary purpose was to maintain un-
restricted access to remedial relief in the law, the Court found that an
inclusive interpretation of this section to protect former employees
was more consistent with the broader context of Title VII. Thus, the
Court reversed the Fourth Circuit and held that former employees are
included within section 704(a)'s coverage' s7
Although the decisions were not directly on point, the Beauford and
Robinson rationales have led courts to interpret Title I of the ADA
differently. One can readily appreciate the impact of these decisions
by examining the arguments offered for a narrow and broad interpre-
tation of Title I. Accordingly, part IV considers and examines these
arguments.
IV. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST A NARROW INTERPRETATION
OF TITLE I
Title I of the ADA does not explicitly state whether a former em-
ployee is a "qualified individual With a disability" for the purpose of
bringing a discrimination suit in fringe benefits."s The Sixth, Seventh,
and Eleventh Circuits interpret Title I's statutory language narrowly,
holding that disabled former employees are not included within the
180. See id. at 343.
181. See id
182. See id. at 345.
183. See id. at 345-46; supra notes 35-55 and accompanying text.
184. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 345.
185. See id at 342-43 (observing that section 703(a) expressly includes discrimina-
tory discharge as one of the unlawful employment practices against which Title VII is
directed).
186. See id. at 346.
187. See id
188. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
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statute's coverage. 189 In part, these courts relied on Beauford v. Fa-
ther Flanagan's Boys' Home'90 to justify their reasoning. On the other
hand, the Second' 91 and Third' 1 Circuits held that disabled former
employees are qualified individuals with disabilities within Title I for
the purpose of challenging post-employment discrimination in fringe
benefits. 93 These courts were guided largely by the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,194 which was decided af-
ter the line of cases'95 precluding former employees from suing under
Title I for discrimination in post-employment benefits. This part ex-
amines the rationales offered on both sides of the debate.
A. Interpreting Title I Narrowly
Strict interpreters reason that disabled former employees may not
challenge post-employment discrimination in fringe benefits under Ti-
tle I. In doing so, they utilize the plain meaning and legislative history
of Title I to reach this conclusion. This section looks at these
arguments.
1. The Plain Language Excludes Disabled Former Employees
Proponents of a narrow interpretation of Title I that excludes dis-
abled former employees from its protection rely on a plain meaning
analysis. Title I prohibits an employer from discriminating against in-
dividuals in regards to hiring, promotions, and firing because of their
disabilities. 96 Title I also prohibits an employer from discriminating
against qualified individuals with disabilities in the provision of fringe
benefits.'97 Noting this general prohibition, a plain meaning analysis
examines Title I's definition of a "qualified individual with a disabil-
ity."' 98 Reading these two provisions in concert, strict interpreters
conclude that the term "qualified individual with a disability" excludes
disabled former employees.' 99
189. See Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 181, 183 (6th Cir. 1996);
EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1045 (7th Cir. 1996); Gonzales v. Garner Food
Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 1523, 1531 (11th Cir. 1996).
190. 831 F.2d 768, 769 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that individuals who are no longer
able to perform the essential functions of their jobs are not qualified to sue under
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act).
191. See Castellano v. City of New York, 142 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 1998).
192. See Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998).
193. See Ford, 145 F.3d at 608; Castellano, 142 F.3d at 69.
194. 519 U.S. 337 (1997); see also supra Part III.B (examining the Court's decision
in Robinson and the rationale it offers).
195. See Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 181 (6th Cir. 1996); EEOC v.
CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir. 1996); Gonzales v. Garner Food Servs., Inc., 89
F.3d 1523 (11th Cir. 1996).
196. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
197. See id. § 12112(b)(2).
198. See id. §12111(8).
199. See Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1530.
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According to this rationale, the ADA's definitions of the terms
"qualified individual with a disability," "employee," and "discrimi-
nate" support a narrow interpretation of Title I. Title I bifurcates the
term "qualified individual with a disability" into two elements: an in-
dividual must have a disability, and must also be able to perform the
essential functions of an employment position with or without a rea-
sonable accommodation.' Within this framework, the plain meaning
of Title I provides that a disabled individual who can work is "quali-
fied" for Title I protection."° Conversely, then, an individual who
does not meet these two elements is afforded no protection under Ti-
tle I. Thus, if the alleged discriminatory action in fringe benefits oc-
curs after a disabled individual is no longer employed and is unable to
perform his former employment position, it naturally follows that the
individual is not included within Title I's coverage.'
Similarly, strict interpreters reason that the plain meaning of this
definition provides no other alternative than to restrict Title I protec-
tion solely to job applicants and current employees. 20 3 For example,
in previous cases, the Eleventh Circuit held that the term "employee"
under section 704(a) of Title VII included former employees.204 This
court reasoned that a narrow interpretation of the term "employee"
that excluded former employees would undermine Title Vii's reme-
dial purpose.0 In the context of Title I of the ADA, however, the
Eleventh Circuit found that excluding former employees from protec-
tion was not inconsistent with ADA policy;206 to do otherwise would
vitiate the "qualified individual with a disability" requirement.2 07
Additional support for a narrow interpretation of Title I rests in the
ADA's definition of the terms "employee" and "discriminate." The
ADA defines "employee" as "an individual employed by an em-
ployer."20 In defining the term "discriminate," the ADA refers to
200. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
201. See Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 181, 186-87 (6th Cir. 1996);
EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1043-44 (7th Cir. 1996); Gonzales, 89 F.3d at
1526-27; see also Beauford v. Father Flanagan's Boys' Home, 831 F.2d 768, 771 (8th
Cir. 1987) (finding that "qualified" individuals under Title V of the Rehabilitation Act
are individuals who can do their jobs).
202. See Parker, 99 F.3d at 186-87; CNA Ins., 96 F3d at 1044-45; Gonzales, 89 F.3d
at 1526.
203. See Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1529.
204. See Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506, 1509-10 (11th Cir. 1988).
205. See id. at 1509 (stating that courts should not strictly construe a statute "to
produce a result which is actually inconsistent with the policies underlying the
statute").
206. See Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1529.
207. See id. ("[I]nterpreting the ADA to allow any disabled former employee to sue
a former employer essentially renders the QID requirement under the Act, that an
individual with a disability hold or desire a position the essential functions of which he
or she can perform, meaningless.").
208. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4) (1994).
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both "job applicants" and "employees., 2°9 According to the statute,
then, Congress chose to distinguish "job applicants" from regular
"employees" under the ADA.21 ° Therefore, if Congress had desired
to provide disabled former employees with Title I protection, it would
have expressly done so, given that it chose to distinguish applicants
from employees. 21' By not doing so, strict interpreters reason, Con-
gress contemplated the plain meaning of these provisions to include
"discrimination encountered solely by job applicants and current
employees. 212
Finally, proponents of a narrow interpretation of Title I dismiss any
attempt to redefine Title I's "qualified individual with a disability" re-
quirement. The EEOC has argued on several occasions that a dis-
abled former employee is a "benefits recipient. '21 3 Though this term
does not appear anywhere in Title I's statutory language, the EEOC
suggests that post-employment status fits within the definition of the
term "employment position" as used in the definition of the term
"qualified individual with a disability. ' 214 Strict interpreters dismiss
this line of reasoning, however, because it confuses the plain meaning
of Title I's statutory language.21 5 Though Congress may have in-
tended to include disabled former employees within Title I coverage,
any such oversight is for Congress to remedy, rather than the
courts.2 1 6
2. The Legislative History of Title I Is Clear
Proponents of a narrow interpretation of Title I of the ADA, in
addition to the plain language, also analyze the ADA's legislative his-
tory. Specifically, strict interpreters examine the purpose of the "es-
sential functions" within the "qualified individual with a disability"
definition and the primary purpose of Title I. Strict interpreters rea-
son that the inclusion of the phrase "essential functions" within the
definition of a "qualified individual with a disability" suggests that
Congress intended to limit Title I protection solely to job applicants
and current employees.217 Congress inserted this phrase to allow em-
ployers flexibility in whom they choose to employ and maintain as
209. See id. § 12112(b)(1).
210. See id. § 12112(a).
211. See Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1526-27.
212. Id. at 1527 n.11.
213. See Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 181, 186-87 (6th Cir. 1996);
EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1043 (7th Cir. 1996).
214. See CNA Ins., 96 F.3d at 1043-44.
215. See id.; see also Parker, 99 F.3d at 187 ("The concept of 'benefits recipient' as
an 'employment position' relies on a convoluted construction of the statutory lan-
guage, which conflicts with the plain meaning of the words.").
216. See Parker, 99 F.3d at 187 ("We should not try to rewrite the [ADA] in a way
that conflicts with what appears to be fairly clear language.").
217. See Gonzales v. Garner Food Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 1523, 1527 (11th Cir. 1996).
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employees. 1 8 Moreover, Congress did not want to force employers to
hire, promote, or retain unqualified, disabled employees.2 19
Further, strict interpreters find that Congress's primary purpose for
enacting Title I of the ADA suggests that disabled former employees
are not included within Title I's coverage?2 0 In enacting Title I, Con-
gress sought to ensure equal access to employment opportunities for
qualified individuals with disabilities." With this purpose in mind,
Title I does not provide absolute protection in the administration of
fringe benefits. Rather, Title I only ensures that disabled individuals
can obtain and keep employment positions.'m Thus, strict interpret-
ers reason that former employees who are unable to work because of
their disabilities were never contemplated to fall under the umbrella
of Title I protections.2'
B. Interpreting Title I Broadly
Broad interpreters reason that a strict reading fails to recognize the
textual ambiguity in Title I and undermines the remedial purpose of
the statute. Accordingly, they look beyond the literal language of the
Title I to permit disabled former employees to challenge post-employ-
ment discrimination in fringe benefits.
1. The Term "Qualified Individual with a Disability" Under Title I
Is Ambiguous
Although Title I provides a definition for the term "qualified indi-
vidual with a disability," proponents of a broad interpretation of Title
I find that this term is ambiguous.224 They point to the apparent dis-
junction between Title I's definition of "qualified individual with a dis-
ability" and the explicit rights that the ADA otherwise confers.225
Furthermore, broad interpreters believe that disabled former employ-
ees are eligible to sue under Title I because its plain meaning does not
specifically limit its protection to current employees.2 6 To bring an
action under Title I, a person must have a disability, and must also be
able to perform the essential functions of an employment position
218. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 55 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 337.
219. See id at 55-56, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 337-38.
220. See Parker, 99 F.3d at 185-87.
221. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1994).
222. See Parker, 99 F.3d at 186 (stating that "the main purpose of Title I was to
ensure that disabled persons could obtain and keep employment, and therefore, it was
not intended to provide relief for [plaintiff]").
223. See id.
224. See Ford, 145 F.3d at 606; Castellano, 142 F.3d at 66-69.
225. See Castellano, 142 F.3d at 69.
226. See Gonzales v. Garner Food Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 1523, 1531-32 (lth Cir.
1996) (Anderson, J., dissenting).
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with or without a reasonable accommodation.227 Proponents of a
broad interpretation of Title I reason that this definition does not
clearly exclude former employees because it contains an internal con-
tradiction.228 If Title I's eligibility requirements really did prevent dis-
abled former employees from challenging post-employment
discrimination in the provision of fringe benefits, such an outcome
would undoubtedly undermine the clear remedial purpose of Title
1.229
Whether Title I contains a temporal qualifier of the term "qualified
individual with a disability" adds to the inconsistency within the statu-
tory framework of the statute. Broad interpreters reason that the
term "qualified individual with a disability" includes both current and
former employees.2 30 Title I's definition for this term does not
demonstrate when a putative plaintiff must be qualified to bring
suit.231 Faced with a similar issue in Robinson, the Supreme Court
reasoned that Title VII's definition of "employee" lacks any temporal
qualifier that limits the scope of protection to current employees. 32
Accordingly, this term may include former employees who were once
employed with or without a reasonable accommodation yet who, at
the time of suit, are completely disabled. 3 Indeed, the governing
language of the general statutory provision of Title I employs the
broader term "individual. '2 34 Therefore, use of the term "individual"
in Title I further supports more inclusive protection than simply cur-
rent employees.
Finally, the EEOC has raised a novel argument in support of a
broad interpretation of Title I: a former employee who is unable to
work because of her disability holds the position of "benefits recipi-
ent. 2z35 Under this line of reasoning, the relevant "employment posi-
tion" in cases involving post-employment benefits is the position the
disabled former employee actually occupies, that of "benefits recipi-
ent. 2z36 The disabled former employee is not expected to perform the
functions of the employment position she previously held. 37 On the
227. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
228. See Ford, 145 F.3d at 605-06.
229. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)-(2).
230. See Ford, 145 F.3d at 606-07; Castellano, 142 F.3d at 67-69. Similarly, in Gonza-
les v. Garner Food Services, Inc., Judge Anderson agreed that nothing in the plain
meaning of the term "employee" limits its scope to current employees as opposed to
former employees. See Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1531 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
231. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
232. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 342 (1997).
233. See Ford, 145 F.3d at 606; Castellano, 142 F.3d at 67.
234. See Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1532-33; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (stating that no
covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability),
235. See Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 181, 186-87 (6th Cir. 1996);
EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1043-44 (7th Cir. 1996); Leonard F. v. Israel
Discount Bank, No. 95 Civ. 6964, 1996 WL 634860, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 1996).
236. See Leonard, 1996 WL 634860, at *3.
237. See CNA Ins., 96 F.3d at 1043-44.
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contrary, the former employee is only expected to meet the non-dis-
criminatory criteria for receipt of benefits, such as making the appro-
priate election and paying the premiums.38 Furthermore, if the
former employee satisfies these criteria, then she is a "qualified indi-
vidual with a disability" within the meaning of Title I of the ADA. 239
Based on this analysis, proponents of a broad interpretation of Title
I find that the term "qualified individual with a disability" is ambigu-
ous.2' As such, the rules of statutory interpretation permit one to
move beyond the literal language of the statute to construe its
meaning. 241
2. The Legislative History Is Inconclusive
While the legislative history provides some support for the inclusion
of disabled former employees within Title I coverage, the House Com-
mittee Report that accompanied the ADA 42 suggests that disabled
former employees are not "qualified individuals with a disability" for
purposes of challenging post-employment discrimination in fringe
benefits under Title I. In determining whether an individual is "quali-
fied," the House Report instructs that such a determination should be
made at the time of the discriminatory employment action, rather
than on the possibility that the employee will become unable to work
in the future.243 A literal reading of this section suggests that "at the
time of the employment action" refers to the actual moment when the
employer withholds or provides unequal benefits.2' Such a reading,
however, focuses on the situation where the inability to perform es-
sential functions may not have arisen at the time of the discriminatory
employment action.245
Broad interpreters reason that a strict reading of the House Com-
mittee Report leads to absurd results in the fringe benefit context.2 46
Such a reading permits employers to discriminate against disabled in-
dividuals who have been "qualified" up to the point of termination,
but who no longer hold employment positions or are no longer able to
perform the essential functions of their former employment due to
their disability.247 For example, an employer could deny post-employ-
ment benefits on the basis of disability to an employee the day after,
238. See Parker, 99 F.3d at 187.
239. See Leonard, 1996 WL 634860, at *3.
240. See Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 606 (3d Cir. 1998); Castellano
v. City of New York, 142 F.3d 58, 66-69 (2d Cir. 1998).
241. See supra notes 35-55 and accompanying text.
242. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 55 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 337.
243. See id., reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 337.
244. See Castellano, 142 F.3d at 67.
245. See id.
246. See id. at 66-67.
247. See id. at 67.
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but not on the day before, that individual retires because of his disa-
bility.2 48 A strict reading would also permit irrational discrimination
among disabled individuals, some of whom could perform the essen-
tial functions of their former employment and others of whom could
not.249 These examples illustrate that a literal reading of the House
Committee Report fails to consider that many employment benefits,
such as disability benefits, are earned during the years of service
before the employment has terminated, and are provided in the years
after the employment relationship has ended.
In addition to this inconclusive legislative history, proponents of a
broad interpretation of Title I look to the purpose of the "essential
functions" requirement within the definition of the term "qualified in-
dividual with a disability."25 In drafting the ADA, the legislative his-
tory suggests that Congress did not intend to compel employers to
hire, promote, or retain unqualified disabled employees.2 51 As a re-
sult, Congress employed the phrase "qualified individual with a disa-
bility" within the statutory language of Title I to reaffirm this
intention. 52 Within this definition, Congress used the term "essential
functions" to ensure that employers could continue to require that all
individuals are capable of fulfilling the responsibilities of their em-
ployment position.253
This legislative history demonstrates Congress's concern with em-
ployee qualifications. Nevertheless, broad interpreters reason that it
does not determine the relevancy of such concern in the post-employ-
ment context.254 According to this logic, Congress's concern is no
longer implicated in the post-employment context, because former
employees who receive post-employment benefits no longer work or
seek to work for their former employers and, therefore, need not per-
form any functions of their former employment position.255 In the
context of post-employment benefits, then, if disabled former employ-
ees could perform the essential functions of their position while em-
ployed, it is irrelevant whether they could also perform such functions
at or after termination of their employment.
Finally, proponents of a broad interpretation of Title I find that the
legislative history does not provide clear congressional intent that Ti-
248. See id. at 67 (explaining that "an employer could terminate an employee in
violation of the ADA and then deny him fringe benefits, yet the employee could bring
no ADA claim for the latter violation because at the time of the discriminatory denial
of fringe benefits he was a former employee who did not 'hold' an employment
position").
249. See id.
250. See id. at 67-68.
251. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 55-56 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 337-38.
252. See id., reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 337-38.
253. See id. at 55, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 337.
254. See Castellano v. City of New York, 142 F.3d 58, 68 (2d Cir. 1998).
255. See id.
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tie I protection is limited to current employees and job applicants.3 -
Congress could have specifically restricted eligibility to sue under Title
I to "current employees" by selectively using that term.327 At the
same time, it could have broadened eligibility to include "former em-
ployees" by incorporating that term within the statutory language of
Title I. Though Congress did not use specific language to make clear
what it meant by the term "qualified individual with a disability," it
did expressly create rights for disabled individuals regarding fringe
benefits." In doing so, broad interpreters reason that this further
complicates the ambiguity in Title I's statutory language concerning a
disabled former employee's eligibility to sue for discrimination in
fringe benefits.1 9
3. The Remedial Purposes Protect Disabled Former Employees
Although the legislative history of the ADA offers little interpretive
guidance regarding Title I's statutory language, it does state Con-
gress's purpose for creating the ADA in general," and Title I in par-
ticular."6 Proponents of a broad interpretation utilize these policy
objectives to construe the meaning of Title 1.262
Congress sought to remove barriers that prevented individuals wvith
disabilities from enjoying the same private and public opportunities
that are available to persons without disabilities.2t Congress created
Title I to eliminate disability discrimination in all aspects of the em-
ployment relationship, including in the administration of post-employ-
ment benefits.' Ultimately, such legislation will be one of the
methods by which disabled individuals fully enjoy all of their rights.26
With these remedial purposes in mind, broad interpreters contend
that a construction that prevents disabled former employees to chal-
lenge post-employment discrimination in friVne benefits effectively vi-
tiates the express protections of the ADA.2 "
Turning to Title I's provision regarding post-employment benefits,
the provision "provide[s] comprehensive protection from discrimina-
tion in the provision of fringe benefits." 7 Under this section, fringe
benefits include pensions, health and life insurance, and other post-
256. See Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 606 (3d Cir. 1998).
257. See id
258. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) (1994).
259. See Ford, 145 F.3d at 607; Castellano, 142 F.3d at 67.
260. See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
261. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b).
262. See Ford, 145 F.3d at 607; Castellano, 142 F.3d at 68-69.
263. See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
264. See Castellano, 142 F.3d at 68.
265. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b).
266. See Ford, 145 F.3d at 606; Castellano, 142 F.3d at 68-69.
267. Castellano, 142 F.3d at 68 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b)(2)).
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employment benefits.2 68 These types of benefits routinely cover cur-
rent employees and former employees. Indeed, pension and profit-
sharing plans are designed for individuals to enjoy in the post-employ-
ment years of their lives.2 69 Moreover, it is not unusual that disability
benefits are paid to individuals because they can no longer work for
their employer.2 70 In extending Title I protection to fringe benefit
plans, therefore, broad interpreters infer that Congress aimed to pro-
tect those routinely and commonly covered by such employer-pro-
vided plans, namely, current and former employees.27'
In light of the conflict among the circuits, disabled former employ-
ees deserve a judicial or legislative resolution of this issue. Accord-
ingly, part V argues that the Supreme Court should resolve this
conflict and hold that disabled former employees are included within
Title I's coverage. Alternatively, part V suggests that Congress should
amend Title I to ensure that disabled former employees receive ade-
quate protection in the provision of fringe benefits.
V. A JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION TO THE
TITLE I ISSUE
As part IV demonstrates, courts have arrived at different definitions
of the "protected class" of individuals under Title I of the ADA.72 A
narrow interpretation of Title I strips employees with disabilities of
their protection once their formal employment ends. 273 On the other
hand, a broad interpretation of Title I permits disabled former em-
ployees to pursue discrimination claims. 4 These conflicting opinions
concerning the scope of the "protected class" under Title I only com-
plicate the status of disabled individuals once their formal employ-
ment ends. Prolonging this uncertainty in the Title I context is likely
to produce unjustified discrimination against disabled former employ-
ees in the provision of fringe benefits.2 75  Therefore, either the
268. See id.
269. See id. at 67-68.
270. See id. at 68.
271. See Ford, 145 F.3d at 607; Castellano, 142 F.3d at 68; see also Gonzales v. Gar-
ner Food Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 1523, 1532 (11th Cir. 1996) (Anderson, J., dissenting)
("It would be counter-intuitive, and quite surprising, to suppose (as the majority nev-
ertheless does) that Congress intended to protect current employees' fringe benefits,
but intended to then abruptly terminate that protection upon retirement or termina-
tion, at precisely the time that those benefits are designed to materialize.").
272. See supra Part IV.
273. See supra Part IV.A.
274. See supra Part IV.B.
275. After Robinson, courts continue to disagree on this issue. At least two district
courts followed the Sixth Circuit's holding in Parker and the Seventh Circuit's holding
in CNA Ins. See Erwin v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 999 F. Supp. 1227 (S.D.
Ind. 1998); Fobar v. City of Dearborn Heights, 994 F. Supp. 878 (E.D. Mich. 1998).
These courts refused to apply the Robinson rationale to allow disabled former em-
ployees to pursue discrimination claims regarding their fringe benefits under Title I.
These courts did not explicitly address the Supreme Court's rationale in Robinson. In
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Supreme Court should finally intervene to resolve this issue, or Con-
gress should take immediate action and amend Title I accordingly.
A. A Supreme Court Resolution
To narrowly construe Title I in a way that affords disabled former
employees no protection against Title I discrimination serves no judi-
cial or societal purpose. Proponents of a narrow interpretation of Ti-
tle I refuse to look beyond Title I's ambiguous statutory language,
stating that it is the role of Congress to remedy such oversights.1 6
This approach fails to recognize that the plain meaning rule is "rather
an axiom of experience than a rule of law." 2' Thus, the Supreme
Court must resolve Title I's ambiguity by broadly interpreting Title I
to include disabled former employees within its coverage. This is con-
sistent with the broader context and remedial purpose of the ADA.
1. The Broader Context of Title I
A holding that disabled former employees are included within Title
I's coverage is more consistent with the broader context of the ADA.
Other sections of the ADA contemplate that disabled former employ-
ees can make use of its remedial mechanisms."' 8 For example, the
ADA's anti-retaliation provision explicitly protects "any individual"
from retaliation by his employers. 79 The language in this provision
parallels the language of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, with the
difference that Title VII refers to "employees" rather than "individu-
als." 0 In any event, "individual" is a broader term than "employee,"
and its use in the ADA provision arguably refers to both current and
former employees. 81
Strict interpreters, however, distinguish post-employment benefit
claims from Title VII anti-retaliation claims on the ground that former
employees' protected interest arises during the period of employment
the absence of a clear ruling by the Supreme Court, these courts declined to revisit
the circuit court decisions. See Erwin, 999 F. Supp. at 1230; Fobar, 994 F. Supp. at 884.
276. See Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 181, 187 (6th Cir. 1996);
supra notes 213-16 and accompanying text.
277. Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 455 (1989)
(quoting Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928)).
278. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a)-(b) (1994) (prohibiting retaliation and coercion
against "any individual").
279. See id. § 12203(a) ("No person shall discriminate against any individual be-
cause such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter
or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.").
280. See id.; see also id § 2000e-3(a) (setting forth unlawful employment practices
with regard to employees).
281. See supra notes 229-33 and accompanying text. 1996); Gonzales, 89 F.3d at
1528.
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only in the latter case.282 Therefore, they reason that a broad inter-
pretation of the term "employee" is necessary to effectuate the reme-
dial purposes of Title VII.283 This characterization, however, is
unpersuasive. Employees enter fringe benefit programs and pay into
such programs during the course of their employment. As such, em-
ployees' entitlement to such benefits arises during their period of em-
ployment. Thus, it is no more necessary with respect to Title VII
retaliation than it is with Title I post-employment benefits to include
disabled former employees to provide meaning to the statute.2 4
2. The Remedial Purposes of Title I
A holding that permits disabled former employees to challenge
post-employment discrimination in fringe benefits is also more consis-
tent with Title I's remedial purpose.285 Employees have a variety of
fringe benefit opportunities to participate in because of their employ-
ment. These fringe benefits include pensions, health and life insur-
ance, and other post-employment benefits.286 With respect to
disability benefit programs, employees often enter such programs
prior to developing physical or mental disabilities. Indeed, some em-
ployees never reap the benefits of such programs because they are
fortunate enough to have no disability when their employment
ends.287 Many employees, however, develop disabilities that become
so debilitating that they are no longer able to continue in their current
employment positions. 8
As certain benefits are meaningful only in the post-employment
context, it is only logical that Title I's coverage reaches the period
when individuals are to reap such benefits. In the context of disability
benefits, once individuals become disabled and eligible for such bene-
fits, those individuals should not lose their right to sue under Title I.
Whether they can work with or without a reasonable accommodation
is irrelevant. It is only important that they were able to perform the
essential functions of their employment positions when the benefits
282. See EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1044 (7th cir. 1996); Gonzales, 89
F.3d at 1528.
283. See CNA Ins., 96 F.3d at 1044-45; Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1528-29.
284. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit, in Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506 (11th Cir.
1988), a Title VII case, observed that the "plain-meaning rule should not be applied to
produce a result which is actually inconsistent with the policies underlying the stat-
ute." Id. at 1509.
285. See supra Part IV.B.3.
286. See Castellano v. City of New York, 142 F.3d 58, 68 (2d Cir. 1998).
287. Cf. Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 603-04 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting
that plaintiff developed a mental disorder and received disability benefits under em-
ployer benefit plan for two years); EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1041-42
(7th Cir. 1996) (noting that plaintiff was diagnosed with severe depression and bipolar
disorder and was eligible to receive employer-provided disability benefits for a two-
year period).
288. See Ford, 145 F.3d at 603; CNA Ins., 96 F.3d at 1041.
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accrued. Congress, through Title I, expressly prohibits discrimination
in fringe benefits." 9 It is not reasonable that Congress would, in the
same breath, permit employers to discriminatorily deny or limit such
benefits to former employees who cease to be "qualified" according to
a literal interpretation of Title I.
Similarly, courts look to Title VII when interpreting the ADA be-
cause of their similar statutory language and remedial purposes.'"
Some circuit courts have held that discrimination in connection with
fringe benefits is actionable by former employees under Title VII391
Title I provides the same protection to disabled individuals.292 As
such, it is unreasonable to distinguish this employment discrimination
law from Title VII by abrogating coverage of disabled former employ-
ees who challenge discrimination that arises out of their employment
relationship because they can no longer work.
In short, strict interpreters' misuse of the plain meaning rule to ana-
lyze Title I fails to resolve its textual ambiguity. Such misuse subse-
quently produces the kind of absurd results that the Supreme Court
instructs courts to avoid.293 Thus, the Supreme Court should resolve
Title I's ambiguity to include disabled former employees within the
scope of Title I's protection. A broad interpretation of Title I allows
disabled former employees to challenge post-employment discrimina-
tion in fringe benefits. Such an interpretation is consistent with the
broader context and remedial purpose of the statute.
Nevertheless, it is uncertain when the Supreme Court may have the
opportunity to resolve this issue. Permitting employers to deprive dis-
abled former employees of a Title I claim is undesirable. Therefore, it
may be appropriate for Congress to take immediate action and amend
Title I to ensure that disabled former employees receive equal treat-
ment in their post-employment years.
B. A Legislative Resohtion
In the absence of a Supreme Court resolution to this issue, Con-
gress should end the debate and amend Title I of the ADA. In its
current form, Title I's statutory language and legislative history permit
employers to hire the most qualified applicants available.29 So long
289. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b)(2) (1994).
290. See Ford, 145 F.3d at 606 (observing that the purpose of the ADA is "to pro-
vide civil rights protections for persons with disabilities that are parallel to those avail-
able to minorities and women" (citations omitted)).
291. See EEOC v. J.M. Huber Corp., 927 F.2d 1322, 1330 (5th Cir. 1991); Brown v.
New York State Teachers' Retirement Sys., 834 F.2d 299, 300 (2d Cir. 1987).
292. See Castellano v. City of New York, 142 F.3d 58, 68 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b)(2)).
293. See Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454.55
(1989).
294. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 55 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 337.
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as employers do not turn away individuals because of their disabilities,
the result is reasonable because Congress never intended Title I to
operate as an affirmative action program.295 Indeed, Congress used
the term "qualified individual with a disability" to reaffirm that the
ADA does not undermine an employer's ability to choose and main-
tain qualified workers.2 9 6
A literal reading of Title I's statutory language and legislative his-
tory, however, permits employers to discriminate freely against dis-
abled former employees regarding their fringe benefits. 297 This result
is unreasonable in light of the broader context and remedial purposes
of Title I. Thus, Congress should amend Title I by inserting terms
such as "current" and "former" to indicate when a potential plaintiff is
"qualified" to bring a claim for discrimination in the provision of
fringe benefits.2 98 Such congressional action effectuates the full pano-
ply of rights that the ADA guarantees.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should resolve the conflict among the circuits
on the issue of whether disabled former employees are qualified indi-
viduals under Title I of the ADA. To resolve the ambiguity in Title I's
statutory language, the Supreme Court should hold that disabled for-
mer employees are within the class of individuals protected by Title I.
This holding is consistent with the broader context and remedial pur-
poses of the ADA.
Alternatively, Congress should take immediate action and amend
Title I of the ADA. Congress should amend Title I by inserting terms
such as "current" and "former" to demonstrate when a potential
plaintiff is "qualified" to bring a claim of discrimination in fringe ben-
efits. Whether Congress or the Supreme Court take the first step,
such action ensures disabled former employees the necessary Title I
remedy to challenge discriminatory denials in fringe benefits.
295. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630 interpretive guidelines (1998).
296. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 55-56 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 337-38.
297. See supra Part IV.A.
298. The § 12111(8) requirement under Title I should not apply to disabled former
employees who can no longer work and seek to challenge post-employment discrimi-
nation regarding their benefits.
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